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Abstract
We consider the following distributed consensus problem: Each node in a complete
communication network of size n initially holds an opinion, which is chosen arbitrarily from
a finite set Σ. The system must converge toward a consensus state in which all, or almost
all nodes, hold the same opinion. Moreover, this opinion should be valid, i.e., it should be
one among those initially present in the system. This condition should be met even in the
presence of an adaptive, malicious adversary who can modify the opinions of a bounded
number of nodes in every round.
We consider the 3-majority dynamics : At every round, every node pulls the opinion
from three random neighbors and sets his new opinion to the majority one (ties are broken
arbitrarily). Let k be the number of valid opinions. We show that, if k 6 nα, where α is a
suitable positive constant, the 3-majority dynamics converges in time polynomial in k and
logn with high probability even in the presence of an adversary who can affect up to o(
√
n)
nodes at each round.
Previously, the convergence of the 3-majority protocol was known for |Σ| = 2 only,
with an argument that is robust to adversarial errors. On the other hand, no anonymous,
uniform-gossip protocol that is robust to adversarial errors was known for |Σ| > 2.
Keywords: Distributed Consensus, Byzantine Agreement, Gossip Model, Majority Rules,
Markov Chains.
1 Introduction
We study the following probabilistic, synchronous process on a complete network of n anony-
mous nodes: At the beginning, each node holds an “opinion” which is an element of an arbitrary
finite set Σ. We call an opinion valid if it is held by at least one node at the beginning. Then,
in each round, the following happens: 1) every node pulls the opinion from three random nodes
and sets its new opinion to the majority one (ties are broken arbitrarily), and 2) an adaptive
dynamic adversary can arbitrarily change the opinions of some nodes. We consider F -dynamic
adversaries that, at every round, can change the opinions of up to F nodes, possibly introducing
non-valid opinions.
Let the system start from any configuration having k valid opinions with k 6 nα for some
constant α < 1 and consider any F -dynamic adversary with F = O(√n/(k5/2 log n)). We prove
that the process converges to a configuration in which all but O(
√
n) nodes hold the same valid
opinion within O((k2
√
log n+k log n)(k+log n)) rounds, with high probability. So, this bounded
adversary has no relevant chances to force the system to converge to non-valid opinions.
This shows that the 3-majority dynamics provides an efficient solution to the stabilizing-
consensus problem in the uniform-gossip model. Previously, this was known only for the binary
case, i.e. |Σ| = 2, while for any |Σ| > 3, it has been an important open question for several years
[3, 12]. Furthermore, still for any |Σ| > 3, o(n)-time convergence of the 3-majority dynamics
was open even in the absence of an adversary whenever the initial bias toward some plurality
opinion is not large.
In the reminder of this section, we will describe in more detail the consensus problem and
various network scenarios in which it is of interest, our result in this setting, and a comparison
with previous related results.
1.1 Consensus (or Byzantine agreement)
The consensus problem in a distributed network is defined as follows: A collection of agents,
each holding a piece of information (an element of a set Σ), interact with the goal of agreeing
on one of the elements of Σ initially held by at least one agent, possibly in the presence of
an adversary that is trying to disrupt the protocol. The consensus problem in the presence
of an adversary (known as Byzantine agreement) is a fundamental primitive in the design of
distributed algorithms [22, 24]. The goal is to design a distributed, local protocol that brings
the system into a configuration that meets the following conditions: (1) Agreement : All non-
corrupted nodes support the same opinion v; (2) Validity : The opinion v must be a valid
one, i.e., an opinion which was initially declared by at least one (non-corrupted) node; (3)
Termination: Every non-corrupted node can correctly decide to stop running the protocol at
some round.
Recently, there has been considerable interest in the design of consensus algorithms in models
that severely restrict both communication and computation [3, 6, 12], both for efficiency consid-
eration and because such models capture aspects of the way consensus is reached in social net-
works, biological systems, and other domains of interest in network science [2, 4, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16].
In particular, we assume an anonymous network in which nodes possess no unique IDs, nor
do they have any static binding of their local link ports (i.e., nodes cannot keep track of who sent
what). From the point of view of computation, the most restrictive setting is to assume that
each node only has O(log |Σ|) bits of memory available, i.e., it just suffices to store a constant
number of opinions. We further assume that this bound extends to link bandwidth available in
each round. Finally, communication capabilities are severely constrained and non-deterministic:
Every node can communicate with at most a (small) constant number of random neighbors in
each round. These constraints are well-captured by the uniform-gossip communication model
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[10, 18, 19]: At every round, every node can exchange a (short) message (say, Θ(log(|Σ|))
bits) with each of at most h random neighbors, where h is a (small) absolute constant1. A
more recent, sequential variant of the uniform-gossip model is the (random) population-protocols
model [3, 1, 2] in which, in each round, a single interaction between a pair of randomly selected
nodes occurs.
The classic notion of consensus is too strong and unrealistic in the aforementioned distributed
settings, that instead rely on weaker forms of consensus, deeply investigated in [3, 4, 5, 12].
In this paper, we consider a variant of the stabilizing-consensus problem [4] considered in [3]:
There, a solution is required to converge to a stable regime in which the above three properties
are guaranteed in a relaxed, still useful form2. More precisely:
Definition 1.1. A stabilizing almost-consensus protocol must ensure the following properties:
- Almost agreement. Starting from any initial configuration, in a finite number of rounds, the
system must reach a regime of configurations where all but a negligible “bad” subset (i.e. having
size O(nγ) for constant γ < 1) of the nodes support the same opinion.
- Almost validity. The system is required to converge w.h.p. to an almost-agreement regime
where all but a negligible bad set of nodes keep the same valid opinion.
- Non termination. In dynamic distributed systems, nodes represent simple and anonymous
computing units which are not necessarily able to detect any global property.
- Stability. The convergence toward such a weaker form of agreement is only guaranteed to
hold with high probability (in short, w.h.p.3) and only over a long period (i.e. for any
arbitrarily-large polynomial number of rounds).
The main result of this paper is on the convergence properties of the 3-majority dynamics
in the uniform-gossip model in the presence of the adaptive F -dynamic adversary (defined
above) and of the adaptive F -static adversary. In the latter, the adversary looks at the initial
configuration, then changes the opinion of up to F nodes and, after that, no further adversary’s
actions are allowed.
Theorem 1.2. Let k 6 nα for some constant α < 1 and F = β
√
n/(k
5
2 log n) for some constant
β > 0. Starting from any initial configuration having k valid opinions, the 3-majority dynamics
reaches a (valid) stabilizing almost-consensus in presence of any F -dynamic adversary within
O((k2√log n+ k log n)(k + log n)) rounds, w.h.p.
Moreover, the same bound on the convergence time holds in the presence of any F -static adver-
sary with a larger bound on F , i.e., F = n/k −√kn log n.
In [7], an Ω(k log n) bound on the convergence-time of the 3-majority dynamics is derived
(that holds even when the system starts from biased configurations): So, our bound is almost-
tight whenever k = O(polylog(n)).
Not assuming a large initial bias of the plurality opinion considerably complicates the analy-
sis. Indeed, the major open challenge is the analysis from (almost) uniform configurations, where
the system needs to break the initial symmetry in the absence of significant drifts towards any
of the initial opinions. So far, this issue has never been analyzed even in the non-adversarial
case. Moreover, the phase before symmetry breaking is the one in which the adversary has
more chances to cause undesired behaviours: Long delays and/or convergence towards non-
valid opinions. In Section 2, after providing some preliminaries, we shall discuss the above
technical challenges.
1In fact, h = 1 in the standard uniform-gossip model. It is easy to verify that all our results still hold in this
more restricted model at the cost of a constant slow-down in convergence time and local memory size.
2 These relaxed convergence properties are described in detail in Section 7 of [3].
3According to the standard definition, we say that a sequence of events En, n = 1, 2, . . . holds with high
probability if P (En) = 1−O(1/n
λ) for some positive constant λ > 0.
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1.2 Previous results
Consensus problems in distributed systems have been the focus of a large body of work in
several research areas, such as distributed computing [17], communication networks [25], social
networks and voting systems [21, 27], distributed databases [10, 11], biological systems and
Chemical Reaction Networks [9]. For brevity’s sake, we here focus on results that are closest in
spirit to our work.
In [3], the authors show that w.h.p. n agents that meet at random can reach valid stabilizing
almost-consensus in O(n log n) pairwise interactions against an F = o(√n)-bounded dynamic
adversary. The adopted protocol is the well-studied third-state protocol [3, 23]. However, their
analysis (and, thus, their result) only holds for the binary case and for the population-protocol
model: At every round only one pair of nodes can interact. The authors left the existence of
protocols for the multi-valued Byzantine case as a final open question [3]. In general, sequential
processes are much easier to analyze than parallel ones (like those yielded by the uniform-gossip
model): For instance, the resulting Markov chains are reversible [20] while those arising from
parallel processes are non-reversible.
In the uniform-gossip model, in [12] the authors provide an analysis of the 3-median rule, in
which every node updates its value to the median of its random sample. They show that this
dynamics converges to an almost-agreement configuration (which is even a good approximation
of the global median) within O(log k · log log n+ log n) rounds, w.h.p. It turns out that, in the
binary case, the median rule is equivalent to the 3-majority dynamics, thus their result implies
that 3-majority is an (F =
√
n)-stabilizing consensus with O(log n) convergence time. However,
in the non-binary case, it requires Σ to be a totally-ordered set and the possibility to perform
basic algebraic operations: This is a rather strong restriction in applications arising from social
networks, voting-systems, and bio-inspired systems. More importantly, we emphasize that,
even assuming an ordered opinion set (Σ,6), the 3-median rule does not guarantee the crucial
property of validity against both F -static (and, clearly, dynamic) adversaries even for very-small
bounds on F (say F = polylog(n)).
We strongly believe that the validity property of consensus plays a crucial role in several
realistic scenarios, such as monitoring sensor networks, bio-inspired dynamic systems, and voting
systems [9, 21, 27].
More recently, the 3-majority rule in the multi-opinion case (i.e. for |Σ| > 3) has been
studied for a stronger goal than consensus, namely, stabilizing plurality consensus [7]. In this
task, the goal is to reach an almost-stable consensus towards the valid opinion initially supported
by the plurality of the nodes. However, the initial configuration is assumed to have a large bias
towards the pluraltiy opinion. Then, let k be the number of valid opinions, and let s be the
initial difference between the largest and the second-largest opinion: By strongly exploiting the
assumption s >
√
kn log n, the authors in [7] proved that, w.h.p., the system converges to the
plurality opinion within time Θ(k log n).
Another version of binary stabilizing almost-consensus is the one studied by Yildiz et al in
[27]: Here, corrupted nodes are stubborn agents of a social network who influence others but
never change their opinions. They prove negative results under a generalized variant of the
classic voter dynamics in the (Poisson-clock) population-protocol model.
2 The Process and its Analysis in a Nuthshell
Preliminaries. We assume a distributed system consisting of n nodes that communicate with
each other over a complete graph via the synchronous uniform-gossip mechanism: In every
round, each node can pull information from (at most) h random neighbors, where h is an
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absolute constant (in this work, h = 3). At the onset, every node chooses an arbitrary item,
called opinion, from an arbitrary finite set Σ. A simple dynamics for consensus is the 3-majority
protocol [7]:
In each round, every node samples three nodes uniformly at random (including itself
and with repetitions) and revises its opinion according to the majority of the opinions
it sees. If it sees three different opinions, it picks the first one.
Clearly, in the case of three different opinions, choosing the second or the third one would not
make any difference, nor would choosing one of the observed opinions uniformly at random.
Since the communication graph is complete and nodes are anonymous, the overall system
state at any round can be described by a configuration c :=
(
c1, ..., c|Σ|
)
, where the support ci
of opinion i is the number of nodes holding opinion i in that system’s state. Given configuration
c, we say that an opinion i is active in c if ci > 0 and, for any set of active opinions W ⊆ Σ,
we define m (W ) := argmini∈W ci. For any variable x of the process, we write x(t) if we
are considering its value at round t and X(t) to denote the corresponding random variable.
Furthermore, following [20], considered a configuration c and a random variable X defined over
the process, we write Pc
(
X(t) = x
)
for P
(
X(t) = x |C(0) = c), i.e., to denote the probability
distribution of the variable X when the system evolves for t consecutive rounds starting from
configuration c. Analogously, we write Ec
[
X(t)
]
for the associated conditional expectation.
The next lemma provides the expected number of nodes supporting a given opinion at round
t+1 (and a general upper bound to it), given the configuration at round t. The simple proof of
the first equality is in [7]. It is also included in Appendix A to make the paper self-contained.
Lemma 2.1 (See [7]). Let c be the configuration at round t and let W ⊆ Σ be the subset of
active opinions in c. Then, for any opinion i ∈W ,
E
[
C
(t+1)
i
∣∣∣C(t) = c] = ci
(
1 +
ci
n
−
∑
j∈W c
2
j
n2
)
6 ci
(
1 +
ci
n
− 1|W |
)
(1)
The above upper bound easily implies that opinions whose supports fall below the average
n/|W | decrease in expectation. This expected drift is a key-ingredient of our analysis and,
as we will see in the next paragraph, it provides useful intuitions about the process. On the
other hand, when c is almost uniform, the above drift turns out to be negligible and symmetry
breaking is due to the inherent variance of the random process.
Failed attempts. When the 3-majority dynamics starts from configurations that exhibit a
large initial support bias between the largest and the second-largest opinions, the approach
adopted in [7] successfully exploits the fact that the initial plurality is preserved throughout
the evolution of the random process, with an expected positive drift that is also preserved,
w.h.p. An intuition of this fact can be achieved from simple manipulations of (1). However, the
aforementioned drift is only preserved if the largest opinion never changes (w.h.p.), no matter
which the second-largest opinion is: a condition that is not met by uniform configurations. A
promising attempt to cope with uniform configurations is to consider the r.v. S(t) = C
(t)
M(t) −
C
(t)
2M(t) where M(t) and 2M(t) are the r.v.s that take the index of (one of) the largest opinion
and of (one of) the second-largest ones, respectively, in round t. For any fixed pair i, j, such
that ci > cj, (1) implies that the difference C
(t+1)
i − C(t+1)j in the next round is positive in
expectation, so a suitable submartingale argument [20] seemed to work in order to show that
the system (rather quickly) achieves a “sufficiently-large” bias toward the plurality as to allow
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fast convergence. This approach would work if the random indicesM and 2M maintained their
initial values across the entire duration of the process. Unfortunately, starting from uniform
configurations, in the next round, the expected difference between the new largest opinion and
the new second largest one may have no positive drift at all. Roughly speaking, in the next
round, the r.v. C
(t+1)
2M(t+1) can be much larger than the r.v. C
(t+1)
M(t) .
A promising dynamics for the stabilizing almost-consensus problem is the one introduced in
[12], in which nodes revise their opinions (assumed to be totally ordered) by taking the median
between the currently held opinion and those held by two randomly sampled nodes. However,
while we do not assume opinions to be integers (or totally ordered), their analysis strongly
relies on the fact that the median opinion (or any good approximation of it) exhibits a strong
increasing drift, even when starting from almost-uniform configuration, whereas no opinion is
“special” to a majority rule when the starting configuration is uniform. The adoption of an
inherently biased function as the median can have important consequences. To get an intuition,
the reader may consider the following simple instance: Σ = {1, 2, 3}, with the system starting
in configuration c1 = n/2, c2 = 0, c3 = n/2. At the end of the first round, a static adversary
changes the values of F = log n nodes, equally distributed in c1 and c3, to value 2. The (non-
valid) value 2 is the global median and some counting arguments show that, while values 1 and 2
have no positive expected drift, the median has an exponential expected drift that holds w.h.p.
whenever c1, c2 = Θ(n). This might fool the system into the configuration in which c2 = n,
thus converging to a non-valid value.
Our New Approach: An Overview. Our analysis significantly departs from the above
approaches. It is important to remark that, for |Σ| > 3, no analysis of the 3-majority dynamics
with almost-uniform initial configurations is known, even in the simpler non-adversarial case.
On the other hand, while simpler, the analysis of the non-adversarial case still has per-se interest
and it requires to address some of the main technical challenges that also arise in the adversarial
case. Section 3 will be thus devoted to the analysis of the non-adversarial case, while an outline
is given in the paragraphs that follow.
When the configuration is (approximately) uniform, Lemma 2.1 says us that the process
exhibits no significant drift toward any fixed opinion. Interestingly, things change if we consider
the random variable C
(t)
m
, indicating the smallest opinion support at round t. Let j 6 k be
the number of active opinions in a given round t, we first prove that the expected value of C
(t)
m
always exhibits a non-negligible negative drift:
E
[
C(t+1)
m
|C(t) = cˆ
]
6 c
m
− ε
√
n
j3/2
, for some constant ε > 0 (2)
This drift is essentially a consequence of Lemma 2.1 and of the standard deviation of r.v.s
C
(t)
i s (see the proof of Lemma 3.3). The analysis then proceeds along consecutive phases, each
consisting of a suitable number of consecutive rounds. If the number of active opinions at
the beginning of the generic phase is j, we prove that, with positive constant probability, C
(t)
m
vanishes within the end of the phase, so that the next phase begins with (at most) j − 1 active
opinions.
We clearly need a good bound on the length of a phase beginning with at most j opinions. To
this aim, we derive a new upper bound - stated in Lemma 3.2 - on the hitting time of stochastic
processes with expected drift that are defined by finite-state Markov chains [20]. Thanks to this
result, we can use the negative drift in (2) to prove that, from any configuration with j 6 k
active opinions, C
(t)
m
drops below the threshold n/j−√jn log n within O(poly(j, log n)) rounds,
with constant positive probability: This “hitting” event represents the exit condition from the
symmetry-breaking stage of the phase. Indeed, once it occurs, we can consider any fixed active
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opinion i having support size ci below the above threshold (thanks to the previous stage, we
know that there is a good chance this opinion exists): We then show that Ci has a negative
drift of order Ω(ci/j). This allows us to prove that Ci drops from n/j−
√
jn log n to zero within
O(poly(j, log n)) further rounds, with positive constant probability. This interval of rounds is
the dropping stage of the phase.
Ideally, the process proceeds along k consecutive phases, indexed as j = k, k − 1, . . . , 2, such
that we are left with at most j − 1 active opinions at the end of Phase j. In practice, we
only have a constant probability that at least one opinion disappears during Phase j. However,
using standard probabilistic arguments, we can prove that, w.h.p., for every j, the transition
from j to j − 1 active opinions takes a constant (amortized) number of phases, each requiring
O(poly(j, log n)) rounds.
The presence of a dynamic, adaptive adversary makes the above analysis technically more
complex. A major issue is that a different definition of Phase must be considered, since the
adversary might permanently feed any opinion so that the latter never dies. So the number of
active opinions might not decrease from one phase to the next one. Essentially, we need to man-
age the persistence of “small” (valid or not) opinions: The end of a phase is now characterized
by one “big” valid color that becomes “small” and, moreover, we need to show that, in general,
“small” colors never becomes “big”, no matter what the dynamic F -bounded adversary does.
An informal description of the dynamic-adversary case is given in Subsection 4.2.
3 The 3-Majority Dynamics without Adversary
Let C ⊆ Σ be the subset of valid opinions, i.e. those supported by at least one node in the
initial configuration, and denote by k = |C| its size. This section is devoted to the proof of the
following result.
Theorem 3.1 (The Adversary-Free Case.). Starting from any initial configuration with k 6
n1/3−ε active opinions, where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily-small constant, the 3-majority dynamics
reaches consensus within O
(
(k2 log1/2 n+ k log n)(k + log n)
)
rounds, w.h.p.
We first provide the lemmas required for the process analysis and then we give the formal proof
of the above theorem.
The next lemma shows an upper bound on the time it takes a stochastic process with values
in N = {0, 1, . . . , n} to reach or exceed a target value m, under mild hypotheses on the process.
We here give only an idea of the proof, the full proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.2. Let {Xt}t be a Markov chain with finite state space Ω, let f : Ω → N be a
function mapping states of the chain in non-negative integer numbers, and let {Yt}t be the
stochastic process over N defined by Yt = f(Xt). Let m ∈ N be a “target value” and let
τ = inf{t ∈ N : Yt > m}
be the random variable indicating the first time Yt reaches or exceeds value m. Assume that, for
every state x ∈ Ω with f(x) 6 m− 1, it holds that
1. (Positive drift). E [Yt+1 |Xt = x] > f(x) + λ for some λ > 0
2. (Bounded jumps). Px (Yτ > αm) 6 αm/n, for some α > 1.
Then, for every starting state x ∈ Ω, it holds that
Ex [τ ] 6 2α
m
λ
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Idea of the proof. From Hypothesis 1 it follows that Zt = Yt−λt is a submartingale that satisfies
the hypotheses of the Doob’s Optional Stopping Theorem [13] (see e.g. Corollary 17.8 in [20] or
Theorem 10.10 in [26]), thus
0 6 f(x) = Ex [Z0] 6 Ex [Zτ ] = Ex [Yτ ]− λEx [τ ]
And from Hypothesis 2 it follows that Ex [Yτ ] 6 2αm.
We now exploit the above lemma in order to bound the time required by the symmetry-breaking
stage.
Lemma 3.3 (Symmetry-breaking stage). Let c be any configuration with j active opinions.
Within t = O
(
j2 log1/2 n
)
rounds it holds that
Pc
(
∃i such that C(t)i 6 n/j −
√
jn log n
)
>
1
2
Sketch of Proof. Let J be the set of j active opinions in c and let C(t) =
(
C
(t)
i : i ∈ J
)
be the
random variable indicating the opinion configuration at round t, where we assume C(0) = c. Let
C
(t)
m
= min
{
C
(t)
i : i ∈ J
}
be the minimum among all C
(t)
i s and consider the stochastic process
{Yt}t defined as Yt = ⌊n/j⌋ −C(t)m . Observe that Yt takes values in {0, 1, . . . , ⌊n/j⌋} and it is a
function of C(t). We are interested in the first time Yt becomes at least as large as
√
jn log n,
i.e.
τ = inf
{
t ∈ N : Yt >
√
jn log n
}
We now show that {Yt}t satisfies Hypotheses 1 and 2 of Lemma 3.2, with λ = ε
√
n/j3/2, for a
suitable constant ε > 0.
1. Let cˆ = (cˆi : i ∈ J) be any configuration with j active opinions such that cˆm > n/j −√
jn log n. We want to prove that
E
[
C(t+1)
m
|C(t) = cˆ
]
6 c
m
− ε
√
n
j3/2
(3)
Two cases may arise.
Case cˆ
m
> n/j − 2ε√n/j: Observe that, in this case, r.v.s {C(t+1)i : i ∈ J} conditional on
{C(t) = cˆ} have standard deviation Ω
(√
n/j
)
. Moreover, they are binomial and negatively
associated. Hence, by choosing ε small enough, from the Central Limit Theorem we have that
P
(
i ∈ J exists such that C(t+1)i 6
n
j
− 6ε ·
√
n
j
)
> 1/2
We thus get
E
[
C(t+1)
m
|C(t) = cˆ
]
6
1
2
(
n
j
− 6ε ·
√
n
j
)
+
1
2
· n
j
=
n
j
−3ε
√
n
j
6 c
m
− ε
√
n
j
6 c
m
− ε
√
n
j3/2
(4)
Case cˆ
m
6 n/j − 2ε
√
n/j: Equation (3) easily follows from Lemma 2.1. Indeed, let i ∈ J be an
opinion such that cˆi = cˆm, then
E
[
C(t+1)
m
|C(t) = cˆ
]
6 E
[
C
(t+1)
i |C(t) = cˆ
]
6 cˆi
(
1 +
cˆi
n
− 1
j
)
6 cˆi
(
1− 2ε√
nj
)
6 cˆi − ε
√
n
j3/2
= cˆ
m
− ε
√
n
j3/2
(5)
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where we used the case’s condition and the fact that cˆi = cˆm > n/(2j).
2. Since random variables
{
C
(t+1)
i : i ∈ J
}
conditional on the configuration at round t are
binomial, it is possible to apply Chernoff bound (though with some care) to prove that
Pc
(
Yτ > α
√
jn log n
)
6
1
n
, for some constant α > 1 (6)
Though this result seems intuitive, its formal proof is less obvious, since τ is a stopping time
and thus itself a random variable. Lemma B.1 in Appendix B offers a formal proof of the above
statement.
From (3) and (6), we have that {Yt}t satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 3.2 with m =
√
jn log n
and λ = ε
√
n/j3/2. Hence Ec [τ ] < j
2
√
log n and, from Markov inequality, for t = 2j2
√
log n,
we finally get
Pc
(
∀ i ∈ J : C(t)i > n/j −
√
jn log n
)
6 Pc
(
τ > 2j2
√
log n
)
6
1
2
We now provide the analysis of the dropping stage: More precisely, we show that, if the system
starts with up to j active opinions and one of them (say i) is below the threshold n/j−√jn log n,
then i drops to the smaller threshold j2 log n within O(j log n) additional rounds. This bound
can be proved w.h.p. since, in this regime, Ci is still sufficiently large to apply the Chernoff
bound. This concentration result is not necessary to the purpose of proving Theorem 3.1, while
it is a key ingredient in the analysis of the adversarial case (Theorem 4.2). The next lemma
can be proved by standard concentration arguments - applied in an iterative way - on the r.v.
C
(t)
i (see Appendix B).
Lemma 3.4 (Dropping stage 1). Let c be any configuration with j 6 n1/3−ε active opinions,
where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily-small positive constant, and such that an opinion i exists with
ci 6 n/j −
√
jn log n. Within t = O(j log n) rounds opinion i becomes O (j2 log n) w.h.p.
In the next lemma we prove that once ci becomes smaller than n/(2j), then opinion i disappears
within further O(j log n) rounds with constant probability. We here give only an idea of the
proof, the full proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.5 (Dropping stage 2). Let c be any configuration with j 6 n1/3−ε active opinions,
where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily-small positive constant, and such that an opinion i exists with
ci 6 n/(2j). Within t = O(j log n) rounds opinion i disappears with probability at least 1/2.
Idea of the proof. If ci 6 n/(2j) in configuration c, then from Lemma 2.1 it follows that
E
[
C
(t+1)
i |C(t) = c
]
6 ci
(
1− 1
2j
)
Moreover, since C
(t+1)
i conditional on
{
C(t) = c
}
is binomial, if j 6 n1/3−ε, from the Chernoff
bound it follows that P
(
C
(t+1)
i > n/(2j) |C(t) = c
)
6 e−Θ(nε). Hence, it is easy to check that
for any initial configuration c with ci 6 n/(2j) the following recursive relation holds
Ec
[
C
(t)
i
]
6
(
1− 1
2j
)
Ec
[
C
(t−1)
i
]
+ e−n
ε/2
8
that for some t = O(j log n) gives Ec
[
C
(t)
i
]
6 1/2. Since C
(t)
i is a non-negative integer-valued
r.v., the thesis then follows from the Markov inequality.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. From Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 it follows that from any configuration
with j 6 k active opinions, within O(k2√log n + k log n) rounds at least one of the opinions
disappears with probability at least 1/4. Thus, within O((k2√log n+k log n)(k+log n)) rounds,
all opinions but one disappear w.h.p.
4 Convergence Time of 3-Majority with Adversary
In this section we consider the presence of a Byzantine adversary that can adaptively change
the opinion of a bounded number of nodes in order to delay convergence time toward a valid
consensus, or even worse, to let the system converge toward a non valid one. We consider two
different adversarial strategies: A static one and a stronger, dynamic one.
4.1 The F -static adversary
At the end of the first round, once every node has fixed his own initial opinion, the adversary
looks at the configuration and arbitrarily replaces the opinion of at most F = n/k −√kn log n
nodes with an arbitrary opinion in Σ. Then the protocol starts the process and no further
adversary’s actions are allowed. Since any opinion the adversary may introduce has size less
than n/k−√kn log n, as a simple consequence of the dropping stage (see Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5),
the static adversarial case easily reduces to the non-adversarial one. We thus get the following
Corollary 4.1. Let k 6 nα for some constant α < 1 and F = n/k − √kn log n. Starting
from any initial configuration having k opinions, the 3-majority protocol reaches a stabilizing
almost-consensus in presence of any F -static adversary within O (k2√log n+ k log n) (k+log n)
rounds, w.h.p.
4.2 The F -dynamic adversary
The actions of this adversary over the studied process can be described as follows. At the end
of every round t, after nodes have updated their opinions (i.e. once the configuration C(t) = c(t)
is realized), the F -dynamic adversary looks at the current opinion configuration and replaces
the opinion of up to F nodes with any opinion in Σ.
In what follows we consider an F -dynamic adversary with F 6 β
√
n/(k
5
2 log n) for a suitable
positive constant β. As we will show in the proof of Lemma C.7, this bound on F turns out to
be almost tight for guaranteeing that the process converges to an almost-consensus regime in
polynomial time, w.h.p.
The presence of the adversary requires us to distinguish between valid and non valid opinions.
So, we recall that the set of valid opinions C ⊆ Σ is the subset of active opinions in the initial
configuration and we observe that, in the reminder of this section, k denotes the number of
valid opinions, i.e., k := |C|.
We are now ready to state our main result in the presence of the dynamic adversary (its full
proof is given in Appendix C).
Theorem 4.2 (The Dynamic-Adversary Case.). Let k 6 nα for some constant α < 1 and
F = β
√
n/(k
5
2 log n) for some constant β > 0. Starting from any initial configuration having
k opinions, the 3-majority reaches a (valid) stabilizing almost-consensus in presence of any
F -dynamic adversary within O((k2
√
log n+ k log n)(k + log n)) rounds, w.h.p.
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Idea of the Proof. We here provide a description of the main technical differences w.r.t. the
analysis for the non-adversarial case.
As discussed in the overview of the process analysis, the adversary can introduce “small” non-
valid opinions and it can keep small valid opinions active that would otherwise disappear (as
shown in Section 3). These facts lead us to the problem of managing “small” opinions: The
rigorous definition of small opinion is determined by the minimal negative drift for C
(t)
m
we
derived in the proof of Lemma 3.3 (see (5)).
Let S := {i
∣∣ ci 6 γ√n/k 32} be the set of small opinions for some constant γ > β, and let its
complement B := S¯ = {i ∣∣ ci > γ√n/k 32 } be the set of big opinions.
It turns out that we cannot use the definition of the (end of) phase adopted in the non-adversarial
case: At least one (valid) opinion dies. Wlog, let us assume that, at the beginning, all the k valid
opinions are big. Then the new phase j is an interval of consecutive rounds, in each of which
exactly j big valid opinions are present. The new goal is to show that at the end of phase j, one
of the j big colors will get small and, moreover, this color (and no other small color) will never
get big. In the symmetry-breaking stage of each phase, we thus need to show that the negative
drift of C
(t)
m
(notice that the latter now denotes the minimum among the j big colors) cannot
be opposed by the actions of the F -dynamic adversary, provided that F 6 β
√
n/(k
5
2 log n).
This fact (stated in Lemma C.7) is obtained via two different technical steps: i) A new bound
on the expected negative drift for C
(t)
m
that considers both the presence of small good opinions
and the adversary’s opposing action (this result is formalized in Lemma C.3); ii) A novel use
of Lemma 3.2 on the hitting time of random processes in order to bound the expect time of
the symmetry-breaking stage. We in fact need to define a new stopping condition that also
includes some “bad” event: Some small (valid or not) color become big. We then show that bad
stopping events never happen along the entire process, w.h.p. (this is essentially guaranteed by
Lemma C.4).
The dropping stage of phase j is now defined as the interval of rounds in which C
(t)
m
drops
from the symmetry-breaking threshold n/j −√jn log n to the size of small colors i.e. γ√n/k 32 .
Similarly to the non-adversary case, we can here fix the big opinion i that is dropped below
the symmetry-breaking threshold and look at its negative drift derived from Lemma C.3. The
drift is strong enough to tolerate the the actions of the F -bounded adversary and implies an
O(j log n) bound on the time required by this second stage of phase j. This stage’s analysis is
given in Lemma C.8.
Finally, after k phases, we are left with one (valid) opinion that accounts for n−O(√n) nodes,
while the remaining nodes can have any (possibly non valid) opinion and reflect the presence
of the adversary. In fact, this is what happens with high probability.
5 Future Works
We strongly believe that our upper bound on the convergence time of the 3-majority dynamics
is not tight w.r.t. k. The factor Ω(k3) seems to be not necessary: We believe that at least
a factor k can be saved. To this aim, we would need to show that “more” opinions get small
during a phase. This number should also depend on the current number of big colors. Another
idea would be that of (also) considering the growth of the maximal opinion. Unfortunately,
differently from the minimal opinion (see (2) in Section 2), we don’t have any good bound on
the expected drift for the maximal opinion that holds from any configuration. So, we don’t see
how to efficiently adapt our approach without this crucial ingredient.
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A Preliminary Results
Proof of Lemma 2.1 According to the 3-majority protocol, a node u gets opinion i if it
chooses 3 times opinion i, or if it chooses two times i and one time a different opinion, or if
it chooses the first time opinion i and then, the second and third time, two different distinct
opinions. Hence, if we denote by X
(t)
i,u the indicator random variable of the event “Node u gets
opinion i at time t”, we have that
P
(
X
(t+1)
i,u = 1 |C(t) = c
)
=
(ci
n
)3
+ 3
(ci
n
)2(n− ci
n
)
+
(ci
n
)[
1−
(∑k
ℓ∈S c
2
ℓ
n2
+ 2
(ci
n
)(n− ci
n
))]
=
( ci
n3
)(
n2 + cin−
k∑
ℓ∈S
c2ℓ
)
Then the inequality in (1) is obtained by observing that the sum
∑
ℓ∈S c
2
ℓ is minimized for
cℓ = n/|S|.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Consider the stochastic process Zt = Yt − λt and observe that for any
state x ∈ Ω with f(x) 6 m− 1 it holds that
E [Zt+1 |Xt = x] = E [Yt+1 |Xt = x]− λ(t+ 1)
> f(x) + λ− λ(t+ 1)
> f(x)− λt
where in the inequality we used Hypotheses 1. Thus Zt is a submartingale up to the stopping
time τ , i.e. E [Zt+1 |Xt] > Zt for any t < τ . Moreover, since |Yt| 6 n the jumps of Zt can be
bounded by a value independent of t
|Zt+1 − Zt| = |Yt+1 − λ(t+ 1)− Yt + λt| 6 n+ λ
and it is easy to see that Hypotheses 1 implies Ex [τ ] <∞, thus we can apply Doob’s Optional
Stopping Theorem [13] (see also, e.g., Corollary 17.8 in [20] and Theorem 10.10 in [26]). It then
follows that Ex [Zτ ] > Ex [Z0] = f(x) and, since Ex [Zτ ] = Ex [Yτ ]− λEx [τ ], we have that
Ex [τ ] 6
Ex [Yτ ]− f(x)
λ
6
Ex [Yτ ]
λ
Finally, we get
E0 [Yτ ] =
n∑
j=1
jP0 (Yτ = j)
=
⌊αm⌋∑
j=1
jP0 (Yτ = j) +
n∑
j=⌊αm⌋+1
jP0 (Yτ = j)
6 (αm) + nP0 (Yτ > αm) 6 2 (αm)
where in the last inequality we used Hypothesis 2.
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B Proofs for the Non-Adversarial Case
Proof of Lemma 3.4 We first prove that the decreasing rate of Ci depends on its value at the
end of the previous round. More formally, if we are in a configuration satisfying the hypotheses
of the lemma:
P
(
C
(t)
i > c
(t−1)
i
(
1− 1
2
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
)))
= P
(
C
(t)
i > c
(t−1)
i
(
1−
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
))
(1 + δ)
)
,
where δ = 12(
1
j −
c
(t−1)
i
n )/1− (1j −
c
(t−1)
i
n )
Using Lemma 2.1 and applying Chernoff bound we have:
P
(
C
(t)
i > c
(t−1)
i
(
1− 1
2
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
)))
6 exp
{
−δ
2
3
(
1−
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
))
c
(t−1)
i
}
= exp
{
−δ
3
(
1
2
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
))
c
(t−1)
i
}
< exp

−13
(
1
2
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
))2
c
(t−1)
i


= n−Θ(1). (7)
The second equality in (7) follows from the definition of δ, while the third inequality follows by
(upper) bounding the denominator of δ by 1, which is always possible since ci/n−1/j < 0 from
the hypotheses. Finally, to prove the last equality, we used the fact that ci > j
2 log n and that
the function x (1− x)2 is decreasing iff x ∈ (1/3, 1), with x = jci/n.
Finally, we can iteratively apply (7) as long as we have at most j active opinions and C
(t)
i
keeps not smaller than j2 log n. By standard concentration arguments we get that the time to
reach this threshold is O (j log n), w.h.p.
Proof of Lemma 3.5 Let J be the set of active opinions. By conditioning on all the configu-
rations cˆ = (cˆℓ : ℓ ∈ J) that the system can take at round t− 1, we can bound the expectation
of C
(t)
i as follows
Ec
[
C
(t)
i
]
=
∑
cˆ
E
[
C
(t)
i |C(t−1) = cˆ
]
Pc
(
C(t−1) = cˆ
)
6
(
1− 1
2j
) ∑
cˆ : cˆi6n/(2j)
cˆi ·Pc
(
C(t−1) = cˆ
)
+ n ·
∑
cˆ : cˆi>n/(2j)
Pc
(
C(t−1) = cˆ
)
6
(
1− 1
2j
)
Ec
[
C
(t−1)
i
]
+ n ·Pc
(
Ct−1i >
n
2j
)
where we used that, for any configuration cˆ with cˆi 6 n/(2j), Lemma 2.1 gives the bound
E
[
C
(t)
i |C(t−1) = cˆ
]
6 cˆi
(
1− 12j
)
. Moreover, if j 6 n1/3−ε, from Chernoff bound it follows
that
P
(
C
(t)
i >
n
2j
|C(t−1) = cˆ
)
6 e−Θ(n
ε)
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for any such configuration cˆ. Hence, for any t we have that Pc
(
C
(t)
i >
n
2j
)
6 te−Θ(n
ε). Indeed,
Pc
(
C
(t)
i >
n
2j
)
6 Pc
(
∃t¯ = 1, . . . , t : C(t¯)i >
n
2j
∧ C(t¯−1)i 6
n
2j
)
6
t∑
t¯=1
Pc
(
C
(t¯)
i >
n
2j
∧ C(t¯−1)i 6
n
2j
)
=
t∑
t¯=1
∑
cˆ : cˆi6n/(2j)
P
(
C
(t¯)
i >
n
2j
|C(t¯−1) = cˆ
)
Pc
(
C(t¯−1) = cˆ
)
6 te−Θ(n
ε)
Thus for any t = poly(n) the following recursive relation holds
Ec
[
C
(t)
i
]
6
(
1− 1
2j
)
Ec
[
C
(t−1)
i
]
+ e−n
ε/2
And it gives
Ec
[
C
(t)
i
]
6
(
1− 1
2j
)t n
2j
+ e−n
ε/3
Hence, for t = 2j(log n + 1) we have that Ec
[
C
(t)
i
]
6 1/2 and since C
(t)
i takes non-negative
integer values, the thesis follows from Markov inequality.
Lemma B.1. Let c be any configuration with j active opinions. Consider the stochastic process
{Yt}t defined as Yt =
⌊
n
j
⌋
−C(t)
m
and define the stopping time τ = inf
{
t ∈ N : Yt >
√
jn log n
}
.
Then:
Pc
(
Yτ > α
√
jn log n
)
6
1
n
.
Proof. First of all, Ec [τ ] < ∞, since C(t)m has a negative drift (see the proof of Lemma 3.3).
Next, from the definition of Yt:
Pc
(
Yτ > α
√
jn log n
)
= Pc
(
C(τ)
m
<
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn log n
)
= Pc
(
∃ℓ : C(τ)ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn log n
)
6
j∑
ℓ=1
Pc
(
C
(τ)
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn log n
)
.
Next, from the definition of the stopping time τ :
Pc
(
C
(τ)
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn logn
)
=
∞∑
t=1
Pc
(
C
(t
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn logn
∧
τ = t
)
=
=
∞∑
t=1
Pc
(
C
(t
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn logn
∧
C(t)
m
6
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∧
s=1
C(t)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
·Pc
(
t−1∧
s=1
C(t)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
=
=
∞∑
t=1
Pc
(
C
(t
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn logn
∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∧
s=1
C(t)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
·Pc
(
t−1∧
s=1
C(t)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
(8)
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where the last equality follows since
(
C
(t
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α√jn log n
)
implies
(
C
(t)
m
<
⌊
n
j
⌋
−√jn log n
)
.
We next consider Pc
(∧t−1
s=1C
(t)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−√jn log n
)
. We can write:
Pc
(
t−1∧
s=1
C(t)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
=
t−1∏
s=1
Pc
(
C(s)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
∣∣∣∣∣
s−1∧
r=1
C(r)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
=
t−1∏
s=1
Pc
(
C(s)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
∣∣∣∣∣C(s−1)m >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
where the last equality follows since the 3-majority process is Markovian. We next give an
upper bound on Pc
(
C
(s)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−√jn log n
∣∣∣∣∣C(s−1)m >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−√jn log n
)
:
Pc
(
C(s)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
∣∣∣∣∣C(s−1)m >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
=
=
∑
cˆ:cˆ
m
>⌊nj ⌋−√jn logn
Pcˆ
(
C(1)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
·Pc
(
C(s−1) = cˆ
∣∣∣∣∣C(s−1)m >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
6
6
∑
cˆ:cˆ
m
>⌊nj ⌋−√jn logn
Pcˆ
(
C
(1)
l >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
·Pc
(
C(s−1) = cˆ
∣∣∣∣∣C(s−1)m >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn logn
)
,
where l = arg cˆ
m
(ties broken arbitrarily). We can give an upper bound onPcˆ
(
C
(1)
l >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−√jn log n
)
using a “reverse” Chernoff bound4. In particular, it is possible to show that
Pcˆ
(
C
(1)
l > (1− δ)Ecˆ
[
C
(1)
l
])
6 1− e−βδ
2
Ecˆ
[
C
(1)
l
]
for a suitable constant β. We use δ =
√
jn log n/Ecˆ
[
C
(1)
l
]
and note that n/2j 6 Ecˆ
[
C
(1)
l
]
6
n/j, so that
Pcˆ
(
C
(1)
l > (1− δ)Ecˆ
[
C
(1)
l
])
6 1− e−4βj2 logn. (9)
Saturating with respect to cˆ yields
Pc
(
C(s)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn log n
∣∣∣∣∣C(s−1)m >
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn log n
)
6 1− e−4βj2 logn.
On the other hand, using standard concentration techniques and recalling that Ecˆ
[
C
(1)
l
]
6
n/2j, we can prove that:
Pc
(
C
(t
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn log n
∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∧
s=1
C(t)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn log n
)
6 e−
α2
6
j2 logn (10)
Next, substituting (9) and (10) into (8), the result follows after simple calculations and by
suitably choosing α.
4A folklore example with complete proofs can be found at http://cstheory.stackexchange.com/questions/14471/reverse-chernoff-bound .
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C Convergence Time of 3-Majority with Adversary
In this section we give the formal definitions of the notions introduced in Section 4.2 and we
provide the proof of the lemmas stated in the proof outline of Theorem 4.2.
The actions of the dynamic adversary over the studied process can be formalized as follows.
Definition C.1. At the end of every round t, after nodes have updated their opinions (i.e.
once the configuration C(t) = c(t) is realized), the F -dynamic adversary looks at the current
opinion configuration and replaces the opinion of up to F nodes with any opinion in Σ. We
define C˜(t) as the configuration that results from the adversary’s action on c(t) and D
(t)
i =
D
(t)
i (c
(0), c˜(0), . . . , c(t−1), c˜(t−1), c(t)) as the r.v. corresponding to the number of nodes that the
adversary adds or removes from ci (note that
∑
i∈Σ |Di| 6 2F ) at the end of the t-th round,
based on all the past history of the process, i.e.
C˜(t) =
(
C
(t)
1 +D
(t)
1 , . . . , C
(t)
|Σ| +D
(t)
|Σ|
)
We consider an F -dynamic adversary with F 6 β
√
n/(k
5
2 log n) for a suitable positive con-
stant β. As we will show in the proof of Lemma C.7, this bound on F turns out to be almost
tight for guaranteeing that the process converges to an almost-consensus regime in polynomial
time, w.h.p.
The presence of the adversary requires us to distinguish between valid and non valid opinions.
So, we recall that the set of valid opinions C ⊆ Σ is the subset of active opinions in the initial
configuration and we observe that, in the reminder of this section, k denotes the number of valid
opinions, i.e., k := |C|. As discussed in the overview of the process analysis (Section 2), the
adversary can introduce “small” non-valid opinions and it can keep active small valid opinions
that would otherwise disappear (as shown in Section 3). These facts lead us to the problem of
managing “small” opinions, whose formal definition can be given as follows.
Definition C.2. Let S := {i
∣∣ ci 6 γ√n/k 32} be the set of the small opinions, where γ is some
constant such that γ > β, and let its complement B := S¯ = {i ∣∣ ci > γ√n/k 32 } be the set of the
big opinions.
We now re-state Theorem 4.2, whose idea of proof is outlined in Section 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. Let k 6 nα for some constant α < 1 and F = β
√
n/(k
5
2 log n) for some
constant β > 0. Starting from any initial configuration having k opinions, the 3-majority
reaches a (valid) stabilizing almost-consensus in presence of any F -dynamic adversary within
O((k2
√
log n+ k log n)(k + log n)) rounds, w.h.p.
Sketch of proof. From Lemmas C.7 and C.8 it follows that from any configuration with j 6 k
active opinions, within O(k2√log n+ k log n) rounds at least one of the opinions becomes small
with probability at least 1/2. Thus within O((k2√log n+k log n)(k+log n)) rounds all opinions
but one become small w.h.p.
In order to prove Lemma C.7 and Lemma C.8, we need the following three lemmas.
Lemma C.3. Let c˜ be any configuration such that |B| 6 j and ∑i∈C¯ c˜(t)i 6 γ√n/k 32 . For some
constant α > 0, for any opinion i such that c˜i > γ
√
n/k
3
2 , it holds
E
[
C
(t+1)
i
∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜] 6 c˜i
(
1− 1
j
+
c˜i + α
√
n/k
n
)
(11)
E
[
C˜
(t+1)
i
∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜] 6 c˜i
(
1−min
{
1
j
− c˜i + α
√
n/k
n
,
1
2
(
1
j
− c˜i
n
)})
(12)
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Proof. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 2.1 we have
E
[
C
(t+1)
i
∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜] 6 c˜i
(
1 +
c˜i
n
−
∑
j c˜
2
j
n2
)
6 c˜i
(
1 +
c˜i
n
−
∑
j∈B c˜
2
j
n2
)
6 c˜i

1 + c˜in −
∑
j∈B
(
n−(k−j+1)γ√n/k 32
j
)2
n2


6 c˜i
(
1 +
c˜i
n
−
∑
j∈B(n− α/4
√
n/k)2
j2n2
)
6 c˜i
(
1 +
c˜i
n
− 1
j
+
α/2
√
n/k
jn
)
6 c˜i
(
1− n/j − c˜i − α/2
√
n/k
n
)
Taking into account any possible action of the adversary, we thus get that
E
[
C˜
(t+1)
i
∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜] = E [C(t+1)i ∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜]+E [D(t+1)i ∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜]
6 c˜i
(
1− n/j − c˜i − α/2
√
n/k
n
)
+ F
6 c˜i

1− n/j − c˜i
n
+
2max
{
α/2
√
n/k, Fn/c˜i
}
n

 . (13)
By distinguishing the cases c˜i > n/(3j) or c˜i < n/(3j), from (13) we get (12).
In Lemma C.4 we prove the following key-properties of the process in the presence of the
dynamic adversary: w.h.p., it is never the case that
1. if in a given round a valid opinion is small then it gets big at a later time, i.e. S(t−1) ⊆ S(t);
2. the size of the overall set of non valid opinions grows beyond γ
√
n/k
3
2 , i.e.
∑
i∈C¯ ci 6
γ
√
n/k
3
2 .
Lemma C.4. If c˜(t) is such that
∑
i∈C¯ c˜
(t)
i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 , then
∑
i∈C¯ C˜
(t+1)
i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 and
S(t) ⊆ S(t+1), w.h.p.
Proof. From Lemma C.3, for each i ∈ S(t) we have that
E
[
C
(t+1)
i
∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜] 6 c˜i
(
1 +
c˜i
n
− 1
k
)
.
From a direct application of the Chernoff bound to C
(t+1)
i , and taking into account any possible
action of the adversary, we thus get that w.h.p.
C˜
(t+1)
i = C
(t+1)
i +D
(t+1)
i 6 γ
√
n
k
3
2
(
1− 1
4k
)
+ F 6 γ
√
n
k
3
2
,
that is, i ∈ S(t) w.h.p. Analogously, we have
E

 ∑
i∈C¯(t)
C
(t+1)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ C˜(t) = c˜

 6∑
i∈C¯
c˜
(t)
i
(
1 +
c˜i
n
− 1
k
)
6 γ
√
n
k
3
2
(
1− 1
2k
)
,
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and then, by applying the Chernoff bound, we get that w.h.p.
∑
i∈C¯(t)
C˜
(t+1)
i =
∑
i∈C¯(t)
C
(t+1)
i +
∑
i
D
(t+1)
i 6 γ
√
n
k
3
2
(
1− 1
4k
)
+ F 6 γ
√
n
k
3
2
,
concluding the proof.
Lemma C.5. Let c˜ be any configuration such that |B| = j and ∑i∈C¯ c˜i 6 γ√n/k 32 . Consider
the stochastic process {Y˜t}t defined as Y˜t =
⌊
n
j
⌋
− C˜(t)
m
and define the stopping time
τ = inf{t ∈ N : Y˜t >
√
jn log n ∨ (∑
i∈C¯
C˜i > γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∨ (S(t−1) 6⊆ S(t))}.
Then, it holds that
Pc
(
Y˜τ > α
√
jn log n
)
6
1
n
.
Sketch of proof. The proof of this Lemma follows from minor modifications of the proof of
Lemma B.1. In particular, the argument is based on the following observations:
1. The event defining the stopping time τ is in this case
E(t) = (Y˜t > (√jn log n) ∨ (∑
i∈C¯
C˜i > γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∨ (S(t−1) 6⊆ S(t))).
The negated of this event is
¬E(t) = (Y˜t 6 (√jn log n) ∧ (∑
i∈C¯
C˜i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∧ (S(t−1) ⊆ S(t))),
which implies the event
(
Y˜t 6
√
jn log n
)
.
2. Proceeding like in the proof of Lemma B.1, we can write an expression that is similar to (8),
with the generic conditioning event
C(s)
m
>
⌊
n
j
⌋
−
√
jn log n,
replaced by ¬E(s). The conditioned event
C
(t)
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn log n,
is instead replaced by the event(
C
(t)
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn log n
)
∧ E(t).
Now, note that the event
C
(t)
ℓ <
⌊
n
j
⌋
− α
√
jn log n,
again implies E(t). Hence, we can still write (8), from which the proof requires some non-hard
adaptations w.r.t. the case without adversary.
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Since the adversary, at time t, may decide what to do based on the full history of the process
up to time t, the stochastic process
{
C˜(t)
}
t
may not be a Markov process anymore. Thus, we
need a more general version of Lemma 3.2.
Lemma C.6. Let {Xt}t be a discrete time stochastic process with a finite state space Ω, let
ft : Ω
t → N be a function mapping histories of the process in non-negative integer numbers,
and let {Yt}t be the stochastic process over N defined by Yt = ft(X0, . . . ,Xt). Let m ∈ N be a
“target value”, let A ⊆ Ω be an arbirary subset of states, and let
τ = inf{t ∈ N : Yt > m or Xt /∈ A}
be the random variable indicating the first time Xt exits from set A or Yt reaches or exceeds
value m. Assume that, for every sequence of states x0, . . . , xt ∈ A with ft(x0, . . . , xt) 6 m− 1,
it holds that
1. (Positive drift). E [Yt+1 |X0 = x0, . . . ,Xt = xt] > ft(x0, . . . , xt) + λ for some λ > 0
2. (Bounded jumps). Px (Yτ > αm) 6 αm/n, for some α > 1.
Then, for every starting state x ∈ A, it holds that
Ex [τ ] 6 2α
m
λ
Proof. The proof is a straight adaptation of the proof of Lemma 3.2, in which we take into
account the full history of the process.
Consider the stochastic process Zt = Yt−λt. For any sequence of states x0, . . . , xt ∈ A with
ft(x0, . . . , xt) 6 m− 1 it holds that
E [Zt+1 |X0 = x0, . . . ,Xt = xt] = E [Yt+1 |X0 = x0, . . . ,Xt = xt]− λ(t+ 1)
> ft(x0, . . . , xt) + λ− λ(t+ 1)
> ft(x0, . . . , xt)− λt
where in the inequality we used Hypotheses 1. Thus, Zt is a submartingale up to the stopping
time τ . Moreover, since |Yt| 6 n then |Zt+1 − Zt| 6 n + λ and, together with Hypotheses 1
this implies Ex [τ ] <∞. Thus, we can apply Doob’s Optional Stopping Theorem [13]. It follows
that Ex [Zτ ] > Ex [Z0] = f0(x) and, since Ex [Zτ ] = Ex [Yτ ]− λEx [τ ], we have that
Ex [τ ] 6
Ex [Yτ ]− f0(x)
λ
6
Ex [Yτ ]
λ
Finally, we get
E0 [Yτ ] =
⌊αm⌋∑
j=1
jP0 (Yτ = j) +
n∑
j=⌊αm⌋+1
jP0 (Yτ = j) 6 (αm) + nP0 (Yτ > αm) 6 2 (αm)
where in the last inequality we used Hypothesis 2.
Now, we can exploit Lemma C.6 to bound the time required by the symmetry-breaking
stage: We show that, from any configuration with j big opinions that satisfies condition H,
within O
(
j2 log1/2 n
)
rounds there exists a opinion supported by at most n/j − √jn log n
nodes with probability at least 1/2.
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Lemma C.7 (Symmetry-breaking stage). Let c˜ be any configuration such that |B| = j and∑
i∈C¯ c˜i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 . Within t = O
(
j2 log1/2 n
)
rounds, with probability at least 1/2 it holds
that
|B| = j,
∑
i∈C¯
C˜i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 and ∃i ∈ B(t) such that C˜(t)i 6 n/j −
√
jn log n
Proof. We proceeds by adapting the proof of Lemma 3.3. Let C˜(0) = c˜ be the initial configura-
tion. Let us consider the stochastic process {Y˜t}t>0 defined as
Y˜t =
⌊
n
j
⌋
− C˜(t)
m
where C˜
(t)
m
= min{C˜(t)i : i ∈ B(t)}. We are interested in the time step
τ = inf{t ∈ N : Y˜t > (
√
jn log n) ∨ (∑
i∈C¯
C˜i > γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∨ (S(t−1) 6⊆ S(t))}
Now we show that {Y˜t}t satisfies the Hypotheses 1 and 2 of Lemma 3.2 with A =
(∑
i∈C¯ C˜i 6
γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∨ (S(t−1) ⊆ S(t)) and λ = ε√n/j3/2, for a suitable constant ε > α.
1. Let c˜ be any configuration such that c˜
m
> n/j −√jn log n. Now we prove that
E
[
C˜(t+1)
m
| C˜(t) = c˜
]
6 c˜
m
− ε
√
n
j3/2
(14)
Case c˜
m
> n/j − 2ε√n/j: Observe that, in this case, random variables {Ct+1i : i ∈ B} have
standard deviation is Ω(
√
n/j). Moreover they are binomial and negatively associated. Hence,
by choosing ε small enough, from the Central Limit Theorem we have that
P
(
i ∈ B exists such that C(t+1)i 6
n
j
− 6ε ·
√
n
j
)
> 1/2
We thus get
E
[
C˜(t+1)
m
| C˜(t) = c˜
]
6
1
2
(
n
j
− 6ε ·
√
n
j
)
+
1
2
· n
j
+
β
√
n
k
5
2 log n
=
n
j
− 2ε
√
n
j
+
β
√
n
k
5
2 log n
6 c˜
m
− ε
√
n
j
6 c˜
m
− ε
√
n
j3/2
(15)
Case c˜
m
6 n/j − 2ε√n/j: Equation (14) easily follows from Lemma C.3. Indeed, let i ∈ B be
a opinion such that cˆi = cˆm, then
E
[
C˜(t+1)
m
| C˜(t) = c˜
]
6 E
[
C˜
(t+1)
i | C˜(t) = c˜
]
6 c˜i
(
1 +
c˜i + α
√
n/k
n
− 1
j
)
6 c˜i
(
1− 2ε√
nj
+
α√
kn
)
6 c˜i − ε
√
n
j3/2
= c˜
m
− ε
√
n
j3/2
where we used the case’s condition and c˜i = c˜m > n/(2j).
2. Since random variables
{
C˜
(t)
i : i ∈ B(t)
}
are binomial conditional on the configuration at
round t− 1, from the Chernoff bound it follows that
Pc˜
(
Y˜τ > α
√
jn log n
)
6
1
n
, for some constant α > 1 (16)
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See Lemma C.5 for the formal statement of the last fact.
From (14) and (16) we have that {Y˜t}t satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma C.6 with m =√
jn log n, λ = ε
√
n/j3/2 and A =
(∑
i∈C¯ C˜i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∨ (S(t−1) ⊆ S(t)). Moreover,
by iteratively applying Lemma C.4, we have that, for any t = O(n2), it holds w.h.p. that(∑
i∈C¯ C˜
(t)
i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∨ (S(t−1) ⊆ S(t)). Thus, from Markov’s inequality, for t = 2j2√log n,
we have that
Pc˜
(∀i ∈ B, (C(t)i 6 n/j −√jn log n) ∧ (∑
i∈C¯
C˜
(t)
i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2
) ∧ (S(0) ⊆ S(t)))
> Pc˜
(
τˆ 6 2j2
√
log n
)
>
1
3
where τˆ = inf{t ∈ N : Y˜t >
√
jn log n}.
Once the smallest opinion goes below the average size of the big opinions by a certain small
amount, we can prove that the process push it in the set of small opinions w.h.p.
Lemma C.8 (Dropping stage). Assume that, at round t′, c˜(t′) is such that
∑
i∈C¯ ci 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 ,
|B(t′)| = j, and an i ∈ B(t′) exists such that γ√n/k 32 6 c(t′)i 6 n/j−
√
kn log n. Then, w.h.p., a
round t′′ = t′+O(k log n) exists such that
∑
i∈C¯ C˜
(t′′)
i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 , i ∈ S(t′′) and |B(t′′)| 6 j− 1.
Proof. By iteratively applying Lemma C.4, we have that, w.h.p., for each t ∈ {t′, . . . , t′′ − 1} it
holds
∑
i∈C¯ C˜
(t)
i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 and i ∈ S(t).
To prove that |B(t′′)| 6 j − 1, we first prove that, for each round t ∈ {t′ + 1, . . . , t′′}, w.h.p.
C˜
(t)
i decreases by a certain extent that depends on c˜
(t−1)
i , regardless of what the adversary does.
Let ψ = (1/j − (c˜(t−1)i + α
√
n/k)/n) If we are in a configuration satisfying the hypotheses
of the lemma, we have
P
(
C
(t)
i > c˜
(t−1)
i
(
1− ψ
2
))
= P
(
C
(t)
i > c˜
(t−1)
i (1− ψ(1 + δ))
)
,
where δ = 12ψ/(1− ψ). Thus, using Lemma C.3 and applying the Chernoff bound we have
P
(
C
(t)
i > c˜
(t−1)
i
(
1− ψ
2
))
6 exp
{
−δ
2
3
ψc˜
(t−1)
i
}
< exp
{
−1
3
(
1
2
ψ
)2
c˜
(t−1)
i
}
= n−Θ(1), (17)
where the second inequality follows from the definition of δ and the fact that its denominator
is smaller than 1, and the equality in (17) follows by minimizing ψ2c˜
(t−1)
i for γ
√
n/k
3
2 6 c
(t′)
i 6
n/j −√kn log n.
It follows that, w.h.p.
C˜
(t)
i = C
(t)
i +D
(t)
i 6 c˜
(t−1)
i
(
1− ψ
2
)
+ F 6 c˜
(t−1)
i (18)
Thus, w.h.p., we can iteratively apply (18) until c˜
(t−1)
i 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 . We next prove that
this happens within O (k log n) rounds, w.h.p. Interestingly, showing that, within O (k log n)
rounds, Ci decreases to a costant fraction of its value at the beginning of the dropping stage
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does not seem obvious. For this reason, we consider the evolution of the displacement nj − Ci,
which seems analytically more tractable. To this purpose, note that (17) implies that, w.h.p.
n
j
− C(t)i >
n
j
− c(t−1)i +
c
(t−1)
i
2
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i + α
√
n/k
n
)
=
n
j
− c(t−1)i +
c
(t−1)
i
2
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
)(
1− α
√
n/k
1/j − c(t−1)i /n
)
=
n
j
− c(t−1)i +
c
(t−1)
i
2
(
1
j
− c
(t−1)
i
n
(
1 +
α
log n
))
=
(
n
j
− c(t−1)i
)(
1 + α1
c
(t−1)
i
2n
)
(19)
for some constant α1 > 0, where in the first equality of (19) we have used that n/j − c(t−1)i >√
kn log n.
We can now conclude the proof of Lemma C.8. We first prove that Ci 6 n/ (2j) within
O (k log n) steps, w.h.p. To this purpose, note that nj − ci >
√
kn log n at the beginning of the
droppign stage from the hypotheses. Furthermore, for some positive constants α2 and α3, as
long as Ci > α3n/j it holds 1 + α1ci/n > 1 + α2/j. Hence, after O (k log n) steps, w.h.p. we
have nj −ci > (1−α3)nj , which in turn implies ci 6 α3n/j. Once ci 6 α3n/j, using again (19) we
have that Ci decreases by a factor 1−Ω(1/j) in every round w.h.p. By standard concentration
arguments we obtain that eventually ci 6 γ
√
n/k
3
2 within O (k log n) more steps, w.h.p.
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